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Abstract. Security folklore holds that a security mechanism based on 
stack inspection is incompatible with a global tail call optimization pol­
icy. An implementation of such a language may have to allocate memory 
for a source-code tail call, and a program that uses only tail calls (and no 
other memory-allocating construct) may nevertheless exhaust the avail­
able memory. In this paper, we prove this widely held belief wrong. We 
exhibit an abstract machine for a language with security stack inspection 
whose space consumption function is equivalent to that of the canonical 
tail call optimizing abstract machine. Our machine is surprisingly simple 
and suggests that tail-calls are as easy to implement in a security setting 
as they are in a conventional one. 
1 Stacks, Security, and Tail Calls 
Over the last ten years, programming language implementors have spent signiﬁ­
cant eﬀort on security issues. This eﬀort takes many forms; one is the implemen­
tation of a strategy known as stack inspection [17]. It starts from the premise 
that trusted components may authorize potentially insecure actions for the dy­
namic extent of some ‘grant’ expression, provided that all intermediate calls are 
made by and to trusted code. 
In its conventional implementation, stack inspection is incompatible with 
a traditional language semantics, because it clashes with the well-established 
idea of modeling function calls with a β or βv reduction [13]. A β reduction 
replaces a function’s application with the body of that function, with the func­
tion’s parameters replaced by the application’s arguments. In a language with 
stack inspection, a β or βv reduction disposes of information that is necessary 
to evaluate the security primitives. 
For this reason, Fournet and Gordon [7] model function calls with a non­
standard β-reduction. To be more precise, β does not hold as an equation for 
source terms. Abstraction bodies are wrapped with context-building primitives. 
Unfortunately, this formalization prohibits a transformation of this semantics 
into a tail-call optimizing (TCO) implementation. Fournet and Gordon recognize 
this fact and state that “[S]tack inspection profoundly aﬀects the semantics of 
all programs. In particular, it invalidates [. . . ]  tail call optimizations.” [7] 
This understanding of the stack inspection protocol also pervades the im­
plementation of existing run-time systems. The Java design team, for example, 
chose not to provide a TCO implementation in part because of the perceived 
incompatibility between tail call optimizations and stack inspection.1 The .NET 
eﬀort at Microsoft provides a runtime system that is properly TCO—except 
in the presence of security primitives, which disable it. Microsoft’s documen­
tation [12] states that “[t]he current frame cannot be discarded when control 
is transferred from untrusted code to trusted code, since this would jeopardize 
code identity security.” 
Wallach et al. [18] suggest an alternate security model that accommodates 
TCO implementations. They add an argument to each function call that repre­
sents the security context as a statement in their belief logic. Statements in this 
belief logic can be unraveled to determine whether an operation is permitted. 
Unfortunately, this transformation is global; it cannot be applied in isolation 
to a single untrusted component, but requires the rewriting of all procedures in 
all system libraries. They also fail to provide a formal language semantics that 
allows a Fournet-Gordon style validation of their claims. 
Our security model exploits a novel mechanism for lightweight stack inspec­
tion [6]. We demonstrate the equivalence between our model and Fournet & 
Gordon’s, and prove our claims of TCO. More precisely, our abstract implemen­
tation can transform all tail calls in the source program into instructions that 
do not consume any stack (or store) space. Moreover, the transformation that 
adds security annotations to the untrusted code is local. 
We proceed as follows. First, we derive a CESK machine from Fournet & 
Gordon’s semantics. Second, we develop a diﬀerent, but extensionally equiva­
lent CESK machine that uses a variant of Flatt’s lightweight stack inspection 
mechanism [6]. Third, we show that our machine uses strictly less space than 
the machine derived from Fournet and Gordon’s semantics and that our machine 
uses as much space as Clinger’s canonical tail-call optimizing CESK machine [4]. 
The paper consists of nine sections. The second section introduces the λsec 
language: its syntax, semantics, and security mechanisms. The third section 
shows how a pair of tail calls between system and applet code can allocate an 
unbounded amount of space. In the fourth section, we derive an extensionally 
equivalent CESK machine from Fournet and Gordon’s semantics; in the ﬁfth 
section, we modify this machine so that it implements all tail calls in a properly 
optimized fashion. The sixth section provides a precise analysis of the space con­
sumption of these machines and shows that our new machine is indeed tail-call 
optimizing. In the seventh section, we discuss the compatibility of our model of 
λsec with Fournet and Gordon’s, using their theory of contextual equivalence. 
The last two sections place our work into context. 
2 The λsec Language 
Fournet and Gordon use as their starting point the λsec-calculus [14,16], a sim­
ple model of a programming language with security annotations. They present 
two languages: a source language, in which programs are written, and a target 
language, which includes an additional form for security annotations. A trusted 
1 Private communication between Guy Steele and second author at POPL 1996 
annotator performs the translation from the source to the target, annotating 
each λ-expression with the appropriate permissions. 
In this security model, all code is statically annotated with a given set of per­
missions, chosen from a ﬁxed set P. A program fragment that has permissions R 
may choose to enable some or all of these permissions. The set of enabled permis­
sions at any point during execution is determined by taking the intersection of 
the permissions enabled for the caller and the set of permissions contained in the 
callee’s label. That is, a permission is considered enabled only if two conditions 
are met: ﬁrst, it must have been legally and explicitly enabled by some calling 
procedure, and second, all intervening stack frames must have been annotated 
with this permission. 
The source language (Ms) adds three expressions to the basic call-by-value 
λ-calculus. The test expression checks to see whether a given set of permissions 
is currently enabled, and branches based on that decision. The grant expression 
enables a privilege, provided that the context endows it with those permissions. 
Finally, the fail expression causes the program to halt immediately, signaling 
a security failure. Our particular source language also changes the traditional 
presentation of the λ-calculus by adding an explicit name to each abstraction so 
that we get concise deﬁnitions of recursive procedures. 
Syntax 
M, N = x | M N  | λf x.M | grant R in M 
| test R then M else N | fail | R[M ] 
x ∈ Identiﬁers 
R ⊆ P  
V ∈ Values = x | λf x.M 
The target language (M ) adds a framing expression to this source language 
(underlined in the grammar). A frame speciﬁes the permissions of a component 
in the source text. To ensure that these framing expressions are present as the 
program is evaluated, we translate source components into target components by 
annotating the result with the source-appropriate permissions. In our case, com­
ponents are λ-expressions. The annotator below performs this annotation, and 
simultaneously ensures that a grant expression refers only to those permissions 
to which it is entitled by its source location.2 
Annotator A : 2P → Ms → M 
AR[[x]] = x 
AR[[λf x.M ]] = λf x.R[AR[[M ]]] 
AR[[M N  ]] = AR[[M ]] AR[[N ]] 
AR[[grant S in M ]] = grant S ∩ R in AR[[M ]] 
AR[[test S then M else N ]] = test S then AR[[M ]] else AR[[N ]] 
AR[[fail]] = fail 
2 Fournet and Gordon present a semantics in which this check is performed at runtime. 
Section 7 discusses the diﬀerences between the two languages in more detail. 
� 
The annotator A consumes two arguments: the set of permissions appropriate 
for the source and the source code; it produces a target expression. It commutes 
with all expression constructors except for λ and grant. For a λ expression, it 
adds a frame expression wrapping the body. For a grant expression, it replaces 
the permissions S that the expression speciﬁes with the intersection S ∩ R. So, 
if a component containing the expression grant {a, b} in E were annotated with 
the permissions {b, c}, the resulting expression would read grant {b} in E′ (where 
E′ represents the recursive annotation of E). 
We adapt Fournet & Gordon’s semantics to our variant of λsec mutatis mu­
tandis. Evaluation of programs is speciﬁed using a reduction semantics based 
on evaluation contexts. In such a semantics, every expression is divided into an 
evaluation context containing a single hole (denoted by •), and a redex. An eval­
uation context is composed with a redex by replacing the context’s hole with 
the redex. The choice of evaluation contexts determines where evaluation can 
occur, and typically the evaluation contexts are chosen to enforce deterministic 
evaluation; that is, each expression has a unique decomposition into context and 
redex. Reduction rules in such a semantics take the form “E[f ] �→ E[g],” where 
f is a redex, g is its contractum, and E is the context (which may be observable, 
as for instance in the test rule). 
Contexts 
E = • |  E M  | V E  | grant R in E | R[E] 
Reduction Rules 
E[λf x.M V ] �→ E[[λf x.M/f ][V/x]M ] 
E[R[V ]] �→ E[V ] 
E[grant R in V ] �→ E[V ] 
E[M ] if  OK[[R]][[E]]
E[test R then M else N ] �→ 
E[N ] otherwise 
E[fail] �→ fail 
where 
OK[[∅]][[E]] = true 
OK[[R]][[•]] = true 
OK[[R]][[E[• M ]]] = OK[[R]][[E]] 
OK[[R]][[E[V •]]] = OK[[R]][[E]] 
OK[[R]][[E[S[•]]]] = R ⊆ S ∧ OK[[R]][[E]] 
OK[[R]][[E[grant S in •]]] = OK[[R − S]][[E]] 
This semantics is an extension of a standard call-by-value reduction seman­
tics. The hole and the two application contexts are standard and enforce left-to­
right evaluation of arguments. The reduction rule for applications is also stan­
dard. The added contexts and reduction rules for frame and grant expressions are 
interesting in that they are largely transparent; evaluation may proceed inside 
of either form, and each one disappears when its expression is a value. These 
expressions aﬀect the evaluation only when a test expression occurs as a redex. 
In this case, the result of the reduction depends on the OK predicate, which is 
applied to the current context and the desired permissions. 
The OK predicate recurs over the continuation from the inside out, suc­
ceeding either when the permissions remaining to check are empty or when the 
context is exhausted. The OK predicate commutes with both kinds of applica­
tion context. In the case of a frame annotation, the desired permissions must 
occur in the frame, and the predicate must succeed recursively. Finally, a grant 
expression removes all permissions it grants from the set of those that need to 
be checked. The stack inspection protocol is, at heart, a lightweight form of 
continuation manipulation [3]. 
In Fournet and Gordon’s framework, a program consists of a set of compo­
nents, each one a closed λ-expression with its own set of permissions. 
Deﬁnition 1 (Components). A ∈ Components = �λf x.Ms, R� 
Finally, the Eval function determines the meaning of a source program. A 
program consists of a list of components. Evaluation is performed by annotating 
each λ-expression with the permissions of its component, and combining all 
such expressions into a single application. This application uses the traditional 
abbreviation of a curried application as a single one. 
Deﬁnition 2 (Eval). 
∗ Eval(�λf x.Mu0, R0� . . .) =  V if (AR0[[λf x.Mu0]] �. . .) → V 
Since the ﬁrst component is applied to the rest, it is presumed to represent 
the runtime system, or at least a linker. Eval is undeﬁned for programs that 
diverge or enter a stuck state. 
3 Tail-Call Optimization 
Modern functional programming languages avoid looping constructs in favor of 
recursion. Doing so keeps the language smaller and simpliﬁes its implementation. 
Furthermore, it empowers programmers to match functions and data structures, 
which makes programs more comprehensible than random mixtures of loops and 
function calls. Even modern object-oriented programmers have recognized this 
fact, as indicated by the inclusion of tail-call instructions in Microsoft’s CLR [2] 
and the promotion of traversal strategies such as the interpreter, composite, or 
visitor patterns [8]. 
Of course, if function calls were implemented na¨ıvely, this strategy would 
introduce an unacceptably large overhead on iterative computations. Each it­
eration would consume a stack frame and long loops would quickly run out of 
space. As Guy Steele pointed out in the late 1970’s, however, language designers 
can have eﬃciency and a small language if they translate so-called tail calls into 
instruction sequences that do not consume any space [9]. Typically, such function 
calls turn into plain jumps, and hence, the translation of a tail-recursive function 
equals the translation of a looping construct. Using this reasoning, the language 
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
deﬁnitions for Scheme require that correct implementations must optimize all 
tail-calls and thereby “support an unbounded number of active tail calls” [11]. 
At ﬁrst glance, tail-call optimization seems inherently incompatible with 
stack inspection. To see this, consider a mutually recursive loop between ap­
plet and library code. 
Abbreviations 
UserFn ∆ user sys.sys user = λ
SystemFn ∆ user sys = λsys user .
ARA[[UserFn]] = λuser sys.RA[sys user ] 
ARS[[SystemFn]] = λsys user .RS[user sys] 
Reduction (w/ Annotations) 
ARA[[UserFn]] ARS[[SystemFn]] 
→ RA[ARS[[SystemFn]] ARA[[UserFn]]] 
→ RA[RS[ARA[[UserFn]] ARS[[SystemFn]]]] 
→ RA[RS[RA[ARS[[SystemFn]] ARA[[UserFn]]]]] 
→ RA[RS[RA[RS[ARA[[UserFn]] ARS[[SystemFn]]]]]] 
. . .  
Reduction (w/o Annotations) 
UserFn SystemFn 
→ SystemFn UserFn 
→ UserFn SystemFn 
→ SystemFn UserFn 
→ UserFn SystemFn 
. . .  
This program consists of two copies of a mutually recursive loop function, 
one a ‘user’ component and one a ‘system’ component. Each takes the other as 
an argument, and then calls it, passing itself as the sole argument. To simplify 
the presentation of the looping functions, we introduce abbreviations for the user 
and system procedures. 
This program is a toy example, but it represents the core of many interactions 
between user and system code. For instance, any co-routine-style interaction be­
tween producer and consumer exhibits this behavior—unfortunately, program­
mers are forced to avoid this powerful and natural style in Java precisely because 
of the lack of tail-call optimization. Perhaps the most common examples of this 
kind of interaction occur in OO-style traversals of data structures, such as the 
above-mentioned patterns. 
The ﬁrst reduction sequence illustrates the steps taken by λsec in evaluating 
the given program, where the two procedures are annotated with their permis­
sions. In this example, the context quickly grows without bound. A functional 
programmer would expect to see a sequence more like the second one. This series 
is also a reduction sequence in λsec, but one which is obtained by evaluating the 
program’s pure source. 
As Fournet and Gordon point out in their paper, all is not lost. They intro­
duce an additional reduction into their abstract machine that explicitly removes 
a frame before performing a call. Unfortunately, as they point out, indiscriminate 
application of this rule changes the semantics. Thus, they impose strict condi­
tions that the machine must check before it can apply the rule. The rule and its 
side conditions clarify that an improved compiler can turn some tail calls into 
jumps, but Fournet and Gordon state that many tail calls cannot be optimized. 
4 An Abstract Machine for λsec 
Following Clinger’s work on deﬁning tail-optimized languages via space complex­
ity classes [4], we reformulate the λsec semantics as a CESK machine [5]. We can 
then measure the space consumed by machine conﬁgurations, programs, and ma­
chines. Furthermore, we can determine whether the space consumption function 
of an implementation is in the same complexity class as Clinger’s machine. 
4.1 The fg Machine 
We begin with a direct translation of λsec’s semantics into a CESK machine, 
which we call “frame-generating” or fg (see ﬁgure 1). A CESK machine has 
four registers: the control string, the environment, the store, and the continua­
tion. The control string indicates which program instruction is being reduced. 
In conventional machines, this is called the program counter. The environment 
binds variable names to values, much like the current stack frame of an assembly 
language machine. The store, like a heap, contains shared values.3 Finally, the 
continuation represents the instruction’s control context; it is analogous to the 
stack. 
The derivation of a CESK machine from a reduction semantics is straight­
forward [5]. In particular, the proof of equivalence of the two models is a reﬁne­
ment of Felleisen and Flatt’s proof, which proceeds by a series of transformations 
from a simple reduction semantics to a register machine. At each step, we must 
strengthen the induction hypothesis by adding a claim about the value of the 
OK predicate when applied to the current context. 
The new Eval function is abstracted over the machine under consideration. In 
particular, the deﬁnition of Evalx for a machine x depends both on the transition 
function, � , and on the empty context, emptyx.→x
In order to ensure that Eval and Evalfg are indeed the same function, the 
Evalx function must employ a “load” function L at the beginning of an execu­
tion that coerces the target program to a valid machine conﬁguration, and an 
“unload” function U at the end, which recursively substitutes values bound in 
the environment for the variables that represent them. 
3	 The store in our model is necessitated by Clinger’s model of tail call optimization; 
a machine with no store can grow without bound due to copying. 
� 
� 
The FG Machine 
Cfg = �M, ρ, σ, κ� | �V, ρ, σ, κ� | �V, σ� |  fail 
κ = �� | �push : M, ρ, κ� | �call : V, κ� | �frame : R, κ� | �grant : R, κ� 
V ∈ Values = �closure : M, ρ� 
ρ ∈ Identiﬁers →f Locations 
α, β ∈ Locations 
σ ∈ Locations →f Values 
emptyfg = �� 
�λf x.M, ρ, σ, κ� �→fg ��closure : λf x.M, ρ�, ρ, σ, κ� 
�x, ρ, σ, κ� �→fg �σ(ρ(x)), ρ, σ, κ� 
�M  N, ρ, σ, κ� �→fg �M, ρ, σ, �push : N, ρ, κ�� 
�R[M ], ρ, σ, κ� �→fg �M, ρ, σ, �frame : R, κ��
 
�grant R in M, ρ, σ, κ� �
→fg �M, ρ, σ, �grant : R, κ�� 
�M, ρ, σ, κ� if OKfg[[R]][[κ]]�test R then M else N, ρ, σ, κ� �→fg �N, ρ, σ, κ� otherwise 
�fail, ρ, σ, κ� �→fg fail 
�V, ρ, σ, ��� �→fg �V, σ� 
�V, ρ, σ, �push : M, ρ�, κ�� �→fg �M, ρ�, σ,  �call : V, κ�� 
�V, ρ, σ, �call : V �, κ�� �→fg �M, ρ�[f �→ β][x �→ α], σ[α �→ V ][β �→ V �], κ� 
if V � = �closure : λf x.M, ρ�� and α, β ∈� dom(σ) 
�V, ρ, σ, �frame : R, κ�� �→fg �V, ρ, σ, κ�
 
�V, ρ, σ, �grant : R, κ�� �
→fg �V, ρ, σ, κ� 
�V, ρ, σ[β, . . .  � �→ V � , . . .], κ� →fg �V, ρ, σ, κ� 
if {β, . . .} is nonempty and 
β, . . .  do not occur in V , ρ, σ, or  κ 
where 
OKfg[[∅]][[κ]] = true 
OKfg[[R]][[��]] = true 
OKfg[[R]][[�push : M, ρ, κ�]] = OKfg[[R]][[κ]] 
OKfg[[R]][[�call : V, κ�]] = OKfg[[R]][[κ]] 
OKfg[[R]][[κ]] if R ⊆ R� OKfg[[R]][[�frame : R�, κ�]] = false otherwise 
OKfg[[R]][[�grant : R�, κ�]] = OKfg[[R − R�]][[κ]] 
Fig. 1. 
Deﬁnition 3 (Evalx). 
∗ Evalx(A, . . .) =  U(V, σ) if Lx(A, . . .) � �V, σ�→x 
where 
Lx(�λf x.Mu0, R0�, . . .) =  �(AR0[[λf x.Mu0]] . . .), ∅, ∅, empty �x
and 
U(�closure : M, {�x1, α1�, . . . , �xn, αn�}�, σ) =  
[U(σ(α1))/x1] . . . [U(σ(αn))/xn]M 
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
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Theorem 1 (Machine Fidelity). For all (�M0, R0�, . . .), 
Evalfg(�M0, R0�, . . .) =  V iﬀ Eval(�M0, R0�, . . .) =  V 
The proof proceeds by induction on the length of a reduction sequence. 
4.2 The fg Machine Is Not Tail-Call-Optimizing 
To see that this implementation of the λsec language is not TCO, we show the 
reduction sequence in the fg machine for the program from section 3, and validate 
that the space taken by the conﬁguration is growing without bound. 
UserClo ∆ user sys.ARA[[UserFn]], ∅�= �closure : λ
SystemClo ∆ ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅�= �closure : λsys user .
∆
ρ0 = [sys �→ α, user �→ β] 
∆
σ0 = [α �→ SystemClo, β  �→ UserClo] 
�ARA[[UserFn]] ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, ∅, ��� 
→fg �ARA[[UserFn]], ∅, ∅, �push : ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, ���� 
→fg �UserClo, ∅, ∅, �push : ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, ���� 
→fg �ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, ∅, �call : UserClo, ���� 
→fg �SystemClo, ∅, ∅, �call : UserClo, ���� 
→fg �RA[sys user ], ρ0, σ0, ��� 
→fg �sys user , ρ0, σ0, �frame : RA, ���� 
→fg �sys, ρ0, σ0, �push : user , ρ0, �frame : RA, ����� 
→fg �SystemClo, ρ0, σ0, �push : user , ρ0, �frame : RA, ����� 
→fg �user , ρ0, σ0, �call : SystemClo, �frame : RA, ����� 
→fg �UserClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : SystemClo, �frame : RA, ����� 
2→fg �RS[user sys], ρ0, σ0, �frame : RA, ���� 
→fg �user sys, ρ0, σ0, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, ����� 
→fg �user , ρ0, σ0, �push : sys, ρ0, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, ������ 
→fg �UserClo, ρ0, σ0, �push : sys, ρ0, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, ������ 
→fg �sys, ρ0, σ0, �call : UserClo, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, ������ 
→fg �SystemClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : UserClo, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, ������ 
7→fg �UserClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : SystemClo, �frame : RA, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, ������� 
7 →fg �SystemClo, ρ0, σ0, 
�call : UserClo, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, �frame : RS, �frame : RA, �������� 
5 An Alternative Implementation 
5.1 How Security Inspections Really Work 
A close look at λsec shows that frame and grant contexts aﬀect the computation 
only when they are observed by a test expression. That is, a program with no 
test expressions may be simpliﬁed by removing all frame and grant expressions 
without changing its meaning. Furthermore, the observations possible with the 
test expression are limited by the OK function. 
In particular, any sequence of frame and grant expressions may be collapsed 
into a canonical table that provides a partial map from the set of permissions to 
one of two conditions: ‘no’, indicating that the permission is not granted by the 
sequence, and ‘grant’, indicating that the permission is granted (and legally so) 
by some grant frame in the sequence. 
To derive update rules for this table, we consider evaluation of the OK func­
tion as the recognition of a context-free grammar over the alphabet of frame 
and grant expressions. We start by simplifying the model to one with a single 
permission. Then each frame is either empty or contains the desired permis­
sion. Likewise, there is only one possible grant. All other continuation frames 
are irrelevant. So a full evaluation context can be seen as an arbitrary string in 
the alphabet Σ = {y, n, g}, where y and n represent frames that contain or are 
missing the given permission, and g represents a grant. Assume the ordering of 
the letters in the word places the outermost frames at the left end of the string. 
With the grammar in place, the OKfg predicate can easily be interpreted as 
a ﬁnite-state machine that recognizes the regular expression Σ∗ gy ∗; that is, a 
string ending with a grant followed by any number of y’s. The resulting FSA has 
just two states, one accepting and one non-accepting. A g always transitions to 
the accepting state, and a n always transitions to the non-accepting state. A y 
causes a (trivial) transition to the current state. 
This last observation leads us to a further simpliﬁcation. Since the presence 
of the character y does not aﬀect the decision of the FSA, we may ignore the 
continuation frames that generate them, and consider only the grant frames and 
those security frames that do not include the desired permission. The regular 
expression indicating the success of OKfg becomes simply Σ∗ g. 
Now consider the reduction semantics again. Although a context represents a 
long string, we cannot reduce all permission information in a context to a single 
state in our machine, because the context also contains expressions waiting to 
be evaluated. In other words, there are many preﬁxes of this “permission word” 
that evaluation depends on. Whenever a sequence of frame and grant expressions 
occurs without interruption, however, it is safe to collapse it, and it is easy to see 
how to do so. A substring ending in a g results in an accepting state, a substring 
ending in an n results in a non-accepting state, and the empty substring does 
not alter the decision. To extend this to the whole language, we must expand 
our single-permission state to a full table of permissions. 
This reasoning also provides an intuitive understanding for the componential 
nature of our annotation scheme. Consider the evaluation of a program con­
taining both annotated and unannotated components. Since this computation 
ignores security frames indicating the presence of a given permission, code that 
has not been annotated at all is equivalent to code that has been granted all 
permissions. This means that system libraries need not be recompiled to take 
advantage of such a scheme. 
� 
� 
The CM Machine 
m ∈ P →f {grant, no}
conﬁgurations : Ccm = �M,ρ, σ, κ� | �V, ρ, σ, κ� | �V, σ� |  fail 
κ = �empty : m� | �push : M,ρ, κ,m� | �call : V, κ,m� 
V ∈ Values = �closure : M,ρ� 
ρ ∈ Identiﬁers →f Locations 
α, β ∈ Locations 
σ ∈ Locations →f Values 
emptycm = �empty : ∅� 
�λf x.M, ρ, σ, κ� � ��closure : λf x.M, ρ�, ρ, σ, κ�→cm 
�x, ρ, σ, κ� � �σ(ρ(x)), ρ, σ, κ�→cm 
�M  N, ρ, σ, κ� � �M,ρ, σ, �push : N, ρ, κ, ∅��→cm 
�R[M ], ρ, σ, κ� � �→cm �M,ρ, σ, κ[R → no]�
 
�grant R in M,ρ, σ, κ� � �M,ρ, σ, κ[R → grant]�
→cm �
�M,ρ, σ, κ� if OKcm[[R]][[κ]]�test R then M else N, ρ, σ, κ� �→cm �N, ρ, σ, κ� otherwise 
�fail, ρ, σ, κ� � fail→cm 
�V, ρ, σ, �empty : m�� � �V, σ�→cm
 
�V, ρ, σ, �push : M,ρ�, κ,m�� →� cm �M,ρ�, σ, �call : V, κ, ∅��
 
�V, ρ, σ, �call : V �, κ,m�� � �M,ρ�[f �→ β][x �→ α], σ[α �→ V ][β �→ V �], κ� 
if V � = �closure : λf x.M, ρ�� and α, β ∈� dom(σ) 
→cm 
�V, ρ, σ[β, . . .  � � �V, ρ, σ, κ�→ V, . . .], κ� →cm 
if {β, . . .} is nonempty and 
β, . . .  do not occur in V , ρ, σ, or  κ 
where 
�. . . ,m�[R � �→ c] =  �. . . ,m[R → c]� (pointwise extension)
 
and
 
OKcm[[∅]][[κ]] = true
 
OKcm[[R]][[�empty : m�]] = (R ∩ m −1(no) = ∅)
 
OKcm[[R]][[�push : M,ρ, κ,m�]] = (R ∩ m −1(no) = ∅) ∧ OKcm[[R − m −1(grant)]][[κ]]OKcm[[R]][[�call : V, κ,m�]] 
Fig. 2. 
5.2 The cm Machine 
In the cm (continuation-marks) machine, each continuation frame contains a 
table of permissions, called a mark. The evaluation steps for frame and grant 
expressions update the table in the enclosing continuation, rather than increasing 
the length of the continuation itself. The OKcm predicate now inspects these 
marks, rather than the frame and grant elements of the continuation. Otherwise, 
the cm machine is the same as the fg machine (ﬁgure 2). 
The Evalcm function is an instance of Evalx. That is, Evalcm is the same as 
Evalfg, except that it uses � as its transition function and emptycm as its 
empty continuation. 
→cm 
The two machines produce the same results. 
Theorem 2 (Machine Equivalence). For all (�M0, R0�, . . .), 
Evalfg(�M0, R0�, . . .) =  V iﬀ Evalcm(�M0, R0�, . . .) =  V 
To prove this theorem, we must show that if the fg machine terminates, the cm 
machine terminates with the same value, and that if the fg machine does not 
terminate in a ﬁnal state, then the cm machine also fails to terminate. 
For the purposes of the proof, we will assume that no garbage collection steps 
are taken, because garbage collection cannot aﬀect the result of the evaluation. 
Lemma 1 (No Garbage Collection). For every evaluation sequence in either 
the fg or cm machine, removing every garbage-collection step produces another 
legal sequence, and no divergent computation is made ﬁnite by such a removal. 
To compare the machines, we introduce the function T . 
T �M, ρ, σ, κ� = �M, ρ, σ, T (κ)� 
T �V, ρ, σ, κ� = �V, ρ, σ, T (κ)� 
T �V, σ� = �V, σ� 
T (fail) =  fail 
T �� = �empty : ∅� 
T �push : M, ρ, κ� = �push : M, ρ, T (κ), ∅� 
T �call : V, κ� = �call : V, T (κ), ∅� 
T �frame : R, κ� = T (κ)[R �→ no]
 
T �grant : R, κ� = T (κ)[R �
→ grant] 
The function T maps conﬁgurations of the fg machine to conﬁgurations of 
the cm machine. A step in the fg machine corresponds to either no steps or one 
step in the cm machine. 
Lemma 2 (Simulation). Given a conﬁguration Ccm, with Ccm = T (Cfg), one 
of the following holds: 
1. Cfg is either fail or �V, σ� 
2. Cfg and Ccm are both stuck. 
� fg and T (C ′3. Cfg →fg C ′ fg) =  Ccm 
4. Cfg � fg and Ccm � fg)→fg C ′ →cm T (C ′ 
The proof is a case analysis on the four cases and the conﬁgurations of the 
machine. The fg machine takes extra steps only when “popping” frame and 
grant continuations after reducing their arguments to values. 
The cm machine can always represent a sequence of frame and grant expres­
sions with a single mark. The sequence of steps below illustrates this for the 
divergent mutually-recursive computation shown in section 3. 
∆ 
RS = {b, c}
∆ 
RA = {a, b} 
�ARA[[UserFn]] ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, ∅, �empty : ∅�� 
� �ARA[[UserFn]], ∅, ∅, �push : ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, �empty : ∅�, ∅��→cm 
� �UserClo, ∅, ∅, �push : ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, �empty : ∅�, ∅��→cm 
� �ARS[[SystemFn]], ∅, ∅, �call : UserClo, �empty : ∅�, ∅��→cm 
� �SystemClo, ∅, ∅, �call : UserClo, �empty : ∅�, ∅��→cm 
� �RA[sys user ], ρ0, σ0, �empty : ∅��→cm 
� �sys user , ρ0, σ0, �empty : [{c} → no]��→cm �
� �sys, ρ0, σ0, �push : user , ρ0, �empty : [{c} → no]���→cm �
� �SystemClo, ρ0, σ0, �push : user , ρ0, �empty : [{c} →� no]�, ∅��→cm 
� �user , ρ0, σ0, �call : SystemClo, �empty : [{c} →� no]�, ∅��→cm 
� �UserClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : SystemClo, �empty : [{c} → no]�, ∅��→cm �
� 2 �RS[user sys], ρ0, σ0, �empty : [{c} →� no]��→cm 
� �user sys, ρ0, σ0, �empty : [{a, c} → no]��→cm �
� �user , ρ0, σ0, �push : sys, ρ0, �empty : [{a, c} → no]���→cm �
� �UserClo, ρ0, σ0, �push : sys, ρ0, �empty : [{a, c} →� no]�, ∅��→cm 
� �sys, ρ0, σ0, �call : UserClo, �empty : [{a, c} →� no]�, ∅��→cm 
� �SystemClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : UserClo, �empty : [{a, c} → no]�, ∅��→cm �
� 7 �UserClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : SystemClo, �empty : [{a, c} →� no]�, ∅��→cm 
� 7 �SystemClo, ρ0, σ0, �call : UserClo, �empty : [{a, c} → no]�, ∅��→cm �
6 Space Consumption 
In order to apply Clinger’s analytic framework of TCO [4], we must extend his 
conﬁguration-measuring function to handle security frames (in the case of the 
fg machine) and marks (in the case of the cm machine). Fortunately, we can use 
the same function for conﬁgurations of both machines. Applying the function to 
the conﬁgurations assumed by the fg and cm machines during the evaluation of a 
program yields space functions Sfg and Scm, mapping programs to the maximum 
space consumed during the evaluations on their respective machines. 
With this extension, we can deﬁne space complexity classes O(Sfg) and 
O(Scm) as the sets of space functions that are asymptotically similar to Sfg and 
Scm. We can demonstrate the inclusion of O(Scm) in  O(Sfg) by mapping conﬁg­
urations of the cm machine onto conﬁgurations of the fg machine and showing a 
worst-case growth of no more than the number of permissions |P|, and the non-
inclusion of O(Sfg) in  O(Scm) by choosing a program (like the example shown 
earlier) that grows without bound in the fg machine but has a ﬁnite bound in 
the cm machine. 
To directly show that the cm machine is TCO, we must deﬁne TCO for this 
language. We deﬁne an oracular machine that makes the right security decisions 
with no information whatsoever, and then show that the cm machine’s space use 
is asymptotically bounded by the complexity class O(So) induced by the oracle’s 
space function So. 
Theorem 3 (Space Complexity). O(So) =  O(Scm) ⊂ O(Sfg) 
7 A Note on TCO in Fournet and Gordon 
Our reduction semantics diﬀers from that presented by Fournet & Gordon [7]. 
In particular, our semantics omits runtime checks for grant expressions against 
their source permissions. While we have justiﬁed this omission with a static 
check (section 5.2), it is important to understand that our evaluator diﬀers from 
Fournet & Gordon’s on programs that do not satisfy this predicate. 
The diﬀerence in the evaluators induces a further diﬀerence in the respective 
contextual equivalence theories. In Fournet & Gordon’s theory, the equation 
∅[ grant ∅ in test R then e else f ] ≡ ∅[ grant R in test R then e else f ] 
holds. The two expressions are contextually equivalent because the permissions 
enabled by the grant are dynamically reduced to the empty set at runtime. In our 
system, though, this runtime check is omitted and the two expressions therefore 
produce diﬀerent results. 
Although this diﬀerence might suggest that the results of this paper do not 
apply to the semantics of Fournet & Gordon, this is not the case. To make this 
point, we sketch an optimization path using their theory of contextual equiv­
alence that reduces any program to one that contains at most two frame ex­
pressions and one grant expression for each ordinary expression. This guarantees 
that the amount of security information in the program is linear in the size of 
the ordinary program. 
Consider an expression containing an arbitrarily long (nested) sequence of 
frame and grant expressions wrapped around a single ordinary expression e. 
Using Fournet & Gordon’s contextual equivalence theory, it can be reduced to 
at most two frame expressions wrapped around at most one grant expression 
wrapped around e. Informally, this optimization path consists of three speciﬁc 
optimizations, using four laws from the theory [7, pp. 311–312]. 
Selected Equations 
(Frame Frame Frame) : R1[R2[R3[e]]] = (R1 ∩ R2)[R3[e]]
 
(Grant Grant) : grant R1 in grant R2 in e = grant R1 ∪ R2 in e
 
(Frame Grant) : R1[grant R2 in e] =  R1[grant R1 ∩ R2 in e]
 
(Frame Grant Frame) : R1 ⊇ R2 ⇒ R1[grant R2 in R3[e]] = R1[R3[grant R2 in e]] 
The ﬁrst reduces a sequence of three or more frame expressions to two frame 
expressions. The second reduces two or more grant expressions to a single grant 
expression. The third moves a frame outward past a grant. We conjecture that 
these optimizations yield a provably TCO machine semantics that is a direct 
modiﬁcation of Fournet & Gordon’s reduction semantics. 
8 Related Work 
This paper is directly inspired by the POPL presentation of a semantics for 
stack inspection by Fournet & Gordon [7], and by our earlier research on an 
algebraic stepper for DrScheme [3]. In this work, we produced a portable and 
provably correct algebraic stepper, based on a novel, lightweight stack inspec­
tion mechanism. Using a primitive function, a program can place continuation 
marks on the stack and inquire about existing marks. If a function places two 
marks on the stack, the run-time environment replaces the ﬁrst with the second. 
Hence, the manipulation of continuation marks automatically preserves tail-call 
optimizations. The key diﬀerence between our earlier work and this paper is 
that continuation marks for security permissions contain negative rather than 
positive information. Once we understood this, we could derive the rest of the 
ideas here in a straightforward manner. 
The initial presentation of stack inspection is due to Wallach et al. [17,18]. 
They provide informal speciﬁcations and multiple implementations for this secu­
rity architecture. Our paper aims to bridge the gap between this implementation 
work and the equational reasoning of Fournet & Gordon. 
Several others [1,15] have considered the problem of adding tail calls to the 
JVM, which does support stack inspection. However, none of these speciﬁcally 
addressed stack inspection or security, and all of them made the simplifying 
assumption that TCO was only possible between procedures of the same com­
ponent; that is, none of them considered calls between user and library code. 
Karjoth [10] presents a semantics for access control in Java 2; his model 
presents rules for the maintenance of access control information, but leaves the 
rules for the evaluation of the language itself unspeciﬁed. Because he includes 
rules for matching ‘call’ and ‘return’ expressions, his system cannot be the foun­
dation for a TCO implementation. 
9 Conclusions 
Our paper invalidates the widely held belief among programming language re­
searchers that a global tail-call optimization policy is incompatible with stack in­
spection for security policies. We develop an alternative implementation of stack 
inspection; we prove that it preserves the observable behavior of all programs; 
and we show that its notion of tail call is consistent with Clinger’s mathematical 
notion of tail-call optimization. It is our belief that translating our ideas into 
a compiler or a virtual machine imposes no additional cost on the implementa­
tion of any other construct. Finally, we expect that such an implementation will 
perform as well or better than a conventional stack inspection implementation. 
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